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Interpreting the Definition of a Whistleblower under
Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision: How and
Why Public Policy Should Guide the Courts in Finding
that Whistleblowers Do Not Need to Report to the SEC
Stephanie Klein*
INTRODUCTION
Broadly, this Comment addresses the question of whether the term
“whistleblower,” as used in the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”), requires a
person to report concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) to later bring a retaliation action. More specifically, this note
focuses on the tension between two specific sections of the whistleblower
provisions under Dodd-Frank, the definition of a whistleblower under title
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), and the anti-retaliation provision under title 15
U.S.C. § 76u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). The more specific question in the context of
the latter provision is whether a whistleblower, who reports disclosures
required under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), must report that
information to the SEC to be eligible to bring a retaliation claim under
Dodd-Frank.
This issue has arisen in the United States district courts, which have generally interpreted the
whistleblower provisions broadly to allow a whistleblower who reports a violation of SOX to bring a
1
retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank without first reporting that claim to the SEC. In July 2013
however, the Fifth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to rule on this issue, and ruled in opposition
to the trend in the district courts, construing the whistleblower provisions narrowly, thereby requiring a
whistleblower who reports a violation of SOX to report to the SEC in order to bring a retaliation claim
under Dodd-Frank. As more of these district court decisions are appealed to the circuit courts, there will
likely be a circuit split on the issue, making the issue one that should eventually rise to the level of the
Supreme Court.

Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the relative statutory
provisions. First, SOX is analyzed by reviewing its anti-retaliation
provisions and the Congressional intent upon its creation after the Enron
scandal. The perceived failures of SOX are also addressed. Although the
issue described above concerns specific provisions under Dodd-Frank, SOX
is an important predecessor to Dodd-Frank and the interplay between the
two statutes’ whistleblower provisions is given consideration in the courts’
analyses in order to interpret the whistleblower provisions under DoddFrank. Second, Dodd-Frank is analyzed by reviewing its anti-retaliation

*
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J.D. Candidate, Florida International University College of Law, May 2015.
See infra Part II.
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provisions and the Congressional intent upon its creation after the 2008
economic recession. Finally, the conflicts and questions raised by DoddFrank’s enactment after SOX, and Dodd-Frank’s amendments to SOX’s
whistleblower provisions are addressed.
Part II of this Comment discusses the case law on this issue. First, the
only federal circuit court case to hear the issue, Asadi v. GE Energy, is
described in detail. Second, the district court cases on the issue are
reviewed by: (i) describing in detail the three pre-Asadi district court cases
that held in opposition to Asadi; (ii) briefly reviewing the post-Asadi district
court cases that disagree with Asadi’s holding; and (iii) briefly reviewing
the post-Asadi district court cases that agree with Asadi’s holding.
Part III engages in an analysis of how the term whistleblower should
be construed. More specifically, this Part argues that a whistleblower who
reports disclosures required by SOX should be able to file a retaliation
claim under Dodd-Frank without reporting directly to the SEC. This
conclusion is reached on two bases. First, an analysis of traditional canons
of statutory interpretation lends support to this conclusion. Second, public
policy, although a non-traditional mode of statutory interpretation, leads to
this result and is perhaps the best means of resolving this conflict.
Overall, this Comment rejects the Asadi Court’s holding and suggests
that the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision should be broadly construed
in accordance with the majority of the district courts’ reasoning, in order to
allow a whistleblower who reports violations of SOX to bring a retaliation
claim under Dodd-Frank without first reporting to the SEC.
PART I
I. Relevant Statutory Provisions
A. The Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) was enacted in response to
a range of public accounting scandals that occurred between 2000 and 2002
in hopes of addressing and preventing the causes of the ensuing crisis.2 The
most well-known of these scandals involved the Enron Corporation. At the
time, Enron was believed to be one of the most financially sound companies
in the U.S., and the collapse of Enron alerted the country to the need for

2

See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2012); see also Jennifer Christian, Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Key
Provisions and Recent Case Developments, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 331, 332 (2006) (before SOX’s
whistleblower provisions were created, federal statutes existed which provided whistleblower
protections but only to those employees of specific government organizations for violations of specific
federal laws).
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drastically different public accounting and auditing standards.3 The Enron
scandal, which was revealed in late 2001, has been briefly described as
follows:
In just 15 years, Enron grew from nowhere to be America’s seventh
largest company, employing 21,000 staff in more than 40 countries.
But the firm’s success turned out to have involved an elaborate scam.
Enron lied about its profits and stands accused of a range of shady
dealings, including concealing debts so they didn’t show up in the
company’s accounts. As the depth of the deception unfolded,
investors and creditors retreated, forcing the firm into Chapter 11
bankruptcy.4
Sarbanes-Oxley aimed to “reduce fraud by forcing corporations to
submit more reliable financial statements and to ensure that auditors could
recognize problems at earlier points in time . . . . SOX was supposed to
minimize fraud perpetrated by individuals within the corporation or closely
connected to it.”5 SOX was also created in an attempt to calm the panic that
surrounded the economic crisis caused by such scandals.6
In response to the crisis and in preparation of enacting the legislation,
congressional hearings were held in developing and cultivating SOX’s
provisions. In particular, one Enron whistleblower’s story sparked an
outcry in Congress.7 This whistleblower attempted to oust Enron’s
3
See Rosemary Peavler, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron Scandal—Why are they
Important?, ABOUT MONEY, http://bizfinance.about.com/od/smallbusinessfinancefaqs/a/sarbanes-oxleyact-and-enron-scandal.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
4
Enron Scandal at-a-Glance, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
1780075.stm.
5
Umang Desai, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 427, 442 (2012).
6
See A price worth paying?, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/
3984019; Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview; Worldcom Files for
Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, THE NY TIMES, (July 22, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/
us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html (during the
same timeframe, Worldcom was also involved in an accounting scandal, which involved the company’s
creation of billions of dollars in false earnings, that contributed to the crisis in 2002, and eventually
submitted the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history.).
7
See Moberly, supra note 2, at 5 (“During the Congressional hearings preceding SarbanesOxley’s enactment, an internal accountant from Enron named Sherron Watkins gave crucial testimony
detailing the way in which the company manipulated its finances to create the illusion of value. She also
testified that she informed CEO Ken Lay about the widespread financial improprieties, first through an
anonymous letter and then in a personal meeting. When Andrew Fastow, Watkins’s supervisor, found
out about the meeting, Fastow tried to fire her. Moreover, the human resources department asked its
outside counsel for advice on whether Watkins could be fired after reporting accounting fraud. The
advice from outside counsel noted that neither Texas law (where Enron was headquartered) nor federal
statutes provided Watkins any protection. Senators became outraged when this letter became public,
noting, ‘after this high level employee at Enron reported improper accounting practices, Enron did not
consider firing [Arthur] Andersen [Enron’s accountant]; rather, the company sought advice on the
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manipulation of its financial statements, and when she did so, Enron tried to
fire her.8 The fact that she received little protection from such adverse
employment action incentivized Congress to create the whistleblower
protections under SOX.9 Congress determined that in order to encourage
whistleblowers to come forward with valuable information, it needed to
create provisions that explicitly protected them.
SOX’s provisions are wide-ranging, and include extended protection
for whistleblowers against retaliation for providing inside tips.10 Generally,
SOX protects six types of illegal conduct.11 But, to provide better
protection to whistleblowers, SOX affords employees of publically traded
companies who report violations a private right of action for retaliation
against their employers.12 One scholar noted that the main idea behind
SOX’s anti-retaliation provision is “‘to motivate employees’ to blow the
whistle ‘by providing employees who make complaints with protection
from employer retaliation in the workplace.’“13
Sections 301 and 806 of SOX contain the whistleblower provisions.14
Section 301 creates a confidential, internal employee reporting system that
serves to identify fraud by identifying instances of questionable conduct in
accounting and auditing.15 Under § 301, publicly traded companies are
required to establish audit committees, which in turn, are required to
establish procedures by which to accept employee complaints about
questionable accounting or auditing matters.16 Section 806 creates criminal
and civil liability for any company that retaliates against a whistleblower,

legality of discharging the whistleblower.’ As a result, Congress included expansive whistleblower provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10 See A Price Worth Paying?, supra note 6. Some of these wide-ranging provisions included:
establishing the accounting oversight board, prohibiting audit firms from engaging in non-audit work for
their clients, requiring companies to establish independent audit committees, forbidding companies from
loaning to its own executives, requiring top executives to certify company accounts, making managers
responsible for maintaining an adequate internal structures and procedures for financial reporting, and
requiring auditors to attest to management’s assessment of the company’s financial status while
disclosing any material weaknesses. See id.
11
See id. SOX’s anti-retaliation provision protects employees who provide information or assist
in an investigation regarding conduct which the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of §§
1341 (fraud and swindles), 1343 (fraud by wire radio or television), 1344 (bank fraud), 1348 (securities
and commodities fraud), any rule of the SEC, or any federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
12
See Moberly, supra note 2, at 7.
13
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the
New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 82 (2012).
14
See Desai, supra note 5, at 443.
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1) (2010); Desai, supra note 5, at 443.
16
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2010).
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including those reporting under § 301, and provides remedies for those
whistleblowers that are retaliated against.17 Specifically, § 806 states that
an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee.”18 The statute defines those lawful acts as:
[P]rovid[ing] information . . . or otherwise assist[ing] in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348,
any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders . . .
[or] to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist
in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the
employer) relating to an alleged violation.19
SOX does not automatically grant a whistleblower direct access to the
courts. To bring a retaliation claim, SOX requires that a whistleblower first
file a complaint with the United States Secretary of Labor, which delegates
authority to handle such claims to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”).20 If OSHA finds in favor of the whistleblower,
it may offer a broad range of remedies.21 If either party appeals the OSHA
decision, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) may review the issue de
novo.22 In turn, the ALJ’s ruling can be appealed under an Administrative
Review Board (“ARB”), and after that, to a federal circuit court of
appeals.23 An additional option given to a whistleblower under SOX is to
withdraw the claim from the ARB and to submit it to a federal district court
for de novo review.24 Remedies available to the plaintiff include the
following: reinstatement, standard back pay, and special damages.25
After SOX was enacted, many remarked how its whistleblower
provisions were the most progressive yet.26 Although SOX was lauded
17

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010); Desai, supra note 5, at 443.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2010).
19
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
20
See Christian, supra note 2, at 338.
21
See Moberly, supra note 2, at 9.
22
See id.
23
Id.
24
See id.
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)-(C) (2010) (compensatory damages under SOX include:
“reinstatement with same seniority status that the employee would have had, but for the discrimination;
the amount of back pay, with interest; and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.”).
26
Moberly, supra note 2, at 9-10 (“Professor Vaughn called it ‘the most important
whistleblower protection law in the world,’ . . . and Professor Cynthia Estlund labeled it the ‘gold
18
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after its creation as being an improvement on whistleblower laws,27 critics
remarked that SOX “gives the illusion of protection without truly
meaningful opportunities or remedies for achieving it.”28 Critics claim that
SOX is missing a financial incentive29 and that it fails to provide any real
motivation for potential whistleblowers to provide information to outside
authorities; therefore, SOX does not offer radical reform.30 In addition,
critics noted that the procedural complexities of bringing a retaliation claim
coupled with the brief statute of limitations resulted in very few
whistleblowers being awarded a positive outcome on their retaliation
claims.31 For those that did win claims, the remedies were considered weak
and often failed to compensate whistleblowers for the retaliation that was
inflicted upon them.32
B. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
Similar to SOX, the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) was enacted in
response to a major financial crisis in the United States.33 In 2010,
standard’ of whistleblower protection. Taxpayers Against Fraud called Sarbanes-Oxley ‘the single most
effective measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation’s
financial markets,’ while Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower
advocacy group, described the Act as ‘the promised land . . . [T]he law represents a revolution in
corporate freedom of speech [that] far surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available for government
workers.’ The press fueled expectations as well. For example, in 2002, Business Week stated that the
Act ‘gives those who report corporate misconduct sweeping new legal protection . . . [W]histleblowers
are going to find life a bit easier.’”).
27
See id. at 10.
28
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Sox and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1764 (2007).
29
See Rapp, supra note 13, at 85.
30 See Lucienne M. Hartmann, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like Whistleblower
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 1279, 1285 (2011).
31
See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1764-65 (“In a study conducted by Professors Earle and
Madek, they report that through May 2006, of the 677 completed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints, 499 were
dismissed and 95 were withdrawn. This demonstrates that, at the least, success at this level is an uphill
battle. Of the cases that went to an administrative law judge (‘ALJ’), only 6 (two percent) of the 286
resulted in a decision for the employee.”); Moberly, supra note 2, at 28-29 (“3.6% of all claimants won
after an OSHA investigation—a paltry amount and lower than almost any other comparable statute. To
put that in real numbers, by July 13, 2005 (almost exactly three full years after Sarbanes-Oxley’s
enactment), OSHA issued 361 Sarbanes-Oxley decisions and thirteen claimants won. While these
numbers seem low, the numbers have been even worse for whistleblowers since the study ended. From
that point until December 31, 2011, more than six years later, only ten more whistleblowers won a case
in front of OSHA. In total, from the Act’s effective date until the end of 2011, employees won 1.8% of
the 1,260 cases OSHA decided. Remarkably, for three straight years between fiscal years 2006 and
2008, OSHA did not decide a single case in favor of a Sarbanes-Oxley claimant. During that time,
OSHA found for employers in 488 straight decisions.”)
32
See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1764-65; Moberly, supra note 2, at 27 (“Unfortunately, even if
Sarbanes-Oxley encouraged employees to report more frequently, the Act often failed to protect them
from reprisals and failed to compensate them consistently for the retaliation they suffered.”).
33
See Desai, supra note 5, at 444-47.
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Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in response to the 2008 recession and
housing market crisis, which can be briefly described as follows:
In 2008 the world economy faced its most dangerous crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The contagion, which began in
2007 when sky-high home prices in the United States finally turned
decisively downward, spread quickly, first to the entire U.S. financial
sector and then to financial markets overseas. The casualties in the
United States included a) the entire investment banking industry, b) the
biggest insurance company, c) the two enterprises chartered by the
government to facilitate mortgage lending, d) the largest mortgage
lender, e) the largest savings and loan, and f) two of the largest
commercial banks. The carnage was not limited to the financial sector,
however, as companies that normally rely on credit suffered heavily.
The American auto industry, which pleaded for a federal bailout, found
itself at the edge of an abyss. Still more ominously, banks, trusting no
one to pay them back, simply stopped making the loans that most
businesses need to regulate their cash flows and without which they
cannot do business. Share prices plunged throughout the world—the
Dow Jones Industrial Average in the U.S. lost 33.8% of its value in
2008—and by the end of the year, a deep recession had enveloped
most of the globe. In December the National Bureau of Economic
Research, the private group recognized as the official arbiter of such
things, determined that a recession had begun in the United States in
December 2007, which made this already the third longest recession in
the U.S. since World War II.34
The causes of the crisis revolve around the following: the fact that
many large institutional investors invested in mortgage backed securities
(“MBS”) with little knowledge of their risks; that many of the borrowers of
the underlying mortgages could no longer meet their loan obligations—
perhaps due to predatory lending practices which led these borrowers to
take advantage of seemingly good credit terms; the fact that credit rating
agencies approved the MBS, which increased investor confidence in the
investment form; the holding of credit default swaps in connection with
such MBS; and the fact that large American financial institutions were so
critical to the economy, the failure of which would lead to catastrophic
outcomes, led to government bailouts of such firms (often called “too big to
fail”).35

34 Joel Havemann, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Year in Review 2008, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1484264/The-Financial-Crisis-of-2008-YearIn-Review-2008 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
35
See Lori Schock, Outline of Dodd-Frank Act and JOBS Act, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
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Dodd-Frank was created to address flaws in the regulatory structure
surrounding the events that took place and that led to the crisis with hopes
of increasing accountability within the financial system, ensuring financial
stability, and decreasing bailouts.36 Dodd-Frank affects almost every aspect
of the U.S. financial system and has been described as a “sweeping
overhaul of our financial system.”37
Dodd-Frank’s sweeping provisions include protection for
whistleblowers. Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as “any individual
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide,
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission,
in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”38 The
anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank provides as follows:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i)  

in providing information to
accordance with this section;

the

Commission

in

(ii)  

in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission
based upon or related to such information; or
(iii)  
in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.),
this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title,
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.39
The last section of the anti-retaliation provision, section (iii), has come
to be a source of great controversy within the courts, and will be referred to
throughout this Comment as the “Third Section.”
Dodd-Frank partly amended SOX and also created alternative forms of
action that coincide with SOX.40 Dodd-Frank amended § 806 of SOX to
specifically cover a publicly traded company’s subsidiaries, including those

COMMISSION (June 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490596#.VK9
MfSvF-AU.
36
See Shannon Kay Quigley, Whistleblower Tug-of-War: Corporate Attempts to Secure Internal
Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 267 (2012); Schock, supra note 35.
37
See Schock, supra note 35.
38
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (a)(6) (2010).
39
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(a) (2010).
40
See Hartmann, supra note 30, at 1286.
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that are privately held.41 Dodd-Frank doubled the statute of limitations for
whistleblowers to bring a retaliation claim under SOX from ninety to one
hundred and eighty days.42 Dodd-Frank also prohibited employee waivers
and pre-dispute arbitration agreements regarding whistleblowers’ antiretaliation protections.43
In comparison to SOX, Dodd-Frank offers significant benefits and
incentives for whistleblowers. Overall, Dodd-Frank creates a greater
incentive for a whistleblower to report concerns and makes it easier for a
whistleblower to bring a retaliation claim.44 Generally, Dodd-Frank does
three things differently from SOX: first, Dodd-Frank offers a broader scope
of actions that are protected against retaliation; second, SOX requires
exhausting an administrative process before bringing a claim to federal
court while Dodd-Frank actions may be brought directly to a United States
district court; third, Dodd-Frank provides for more extensive remedies.45
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank creates a new private right of action for
whistleblowers that are retaliated against which, unlike SOX, allows
whistleblowers to bring their claims directly in a district court without first
having to exhaust administrative remedies under OSHA.46 Section 922 of
Dodd-Frank also creates a bounty program by which whistleblowers receive
a monetary reward of between ten and thirty percent of the overall recovery
if the whistleblower provides original information that leads to successful
action by the SEC and results in a minimum monetary sanction of one
million dollars.47
Whistleblowers have a greater incentive to report violations to the SEC
based on Dodd-Frank’s Bounty Program.48 In the event of retaliation,
whistleblowers are protected based on Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation

41
See Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really
Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of
Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 914 (2011)
(stating that the amendment “eliminate[ed] the often-used defense that publicly traded companies are not
liable for the actions of their non-publicly traded subsidiaries”); Hartmann, supra note 30, at 1299.
42
See Moberly, supra note 2, at 16.
43
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (2010).
44
See Desai, supra note 5, at 451.
45
See Hartmann, supra note 30, at 1302-03.
46
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i); Beller, supra note 41, at 914 (stating that unlike SOX,
there is no requirement for the employee to reasonably believe that the reported conduct violates a law,
making it more likely that whistleblower claims under Dodd-Frank will progress further during litigation
that those brought under SOX).
47
See Beller, supra note 41, at 915.
48 See id. at 914-15. The Bounty Program under Dodd-Frank allows a whistleblower “who
voluntarily provide[s] original information to the Commission that [leads] to the successful enforcement
of . . . [an] action” to receive an award of ten to thirty percent, in total, of what the monetary sanctions
imposed in the action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).
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provision and they are adequately rewarded for winning retaliation claims,
where they may receive reinstatement, double back pay, and reimbursement
for attorneys’ fees.49 Finally, whistleblowers bringing a retaliation claim
under Dodd-Frank benefit from an increased statute of limitations, which is
six years to bring a retaliation claim from the date of retaliation or three
years after the material facts are known.50
Many scholars have commented that Dodd-Frank creates a two-tiered
system of retaliation protection across SOX and Dodd-Frank because if
whistleblowers report to the SEC they receive greater protection, but if they
report internally, they may receive less protection.51 Generally speaking,
“the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program seems to be at odds with the
objective of US SOX to strengthen internal corporate compliance
programs.”52
The two-tiered system under SOX and Dodd-Frank
discourages internal reporting;53 however, corporations must maintain the
internal reporting controls required by SOX. Though simultaneously,
Dodd-Frank offers monetary incentives that directly undermine the purpose
of SOX’s internal compliance programs.54
Therefore, Dodd-Frank
essentially weakens the internal compliance system put in place by SOX by
discouraging employees to report internally and encouraging them to report
directly to the SEC in hopes of receiving a monetary award.55 The SEC
tried to address such concerns by implementing policies to encourage
internal reporting first, but there is no indication that such policies do, in
fact, encourage internal reporting.
PART II
After Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions were enacted, many
employees who internally reported potential violations of securities laws
under SOX, and who subsequently suffered adverse employment actions,
came forward seeking protection under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
provisions. The courts hearing these cases have struggled with the issue of
whether whistleblowers making disclosures required by SOX must report
the information to the SEC, as opposed to reporting internally, to avail

49

See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2010).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2010).
51
See Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers
to Report Suspected Violations to the Sec. - Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, S 922, 124 Stat.
1376, 1841-49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2011)
[hereinafter Corporate Law—Securities Regulation].
52
Beller, supra note 41, at 915.
53
See Corporate Law—Securities Regulation, supra note 51.
54
See generally Quigley, supra note 36.
55
See id.; Hartmann, supra note 30, at 1307.
50
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themselves of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions. The tension lies in
the statutory language of Dodd-Frank; on one hand, Dodd-Frank’s
definition of a whistleblower clearly states that a whistleblower is one who
reports to the SEC,56 on the other hand, the anti-retaliation provision of
Dodd-Frank provides three categories of action which are protected from
retaliation,57 the Third Section includes disclosures required by SOX, which
can be read as an exception to the general requirement of a Dodd-Frank
whistleblower to report to the SEC.
The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. GE Energy,58 is the only circuit court to
hear the issue thus far, and found that whistleblowers making disclosures
required by SOX must report to the SEC to avail themselves of retaliation
protection under Dodd-Frank. Numerous district courts have heard the
issue and have held on both sides—some agree with Asadi, while the
majority disagree with Asadi’s holding, finding that internal reporting of
violations required by SOX are sufficient to state a claim under DoddFrank. For purposes of this Part, the Asadi holding is considered to be the
narrow interpretation of the statutory provision at issue, and the contrary
view is considered to be the broad interpretation of the statutory provision
at issue.
With so much tension, and often times vehemently opposing views,
this issue is certain to be heard by more circuit courts in the future, and, if a
circuit split ensues, may ultimately reach the U.S. Supreme Court. The
following Part II, section I, first gives a detailed description of the Fifth
Circuit’s hearing on this issue in Asadi. Second, Part II, section II reviews
the district court’s holding on the issue by giving a detailed description on
those cases heard prior to Asadi and which found for a broad definition of a
whistleblower. Finally, Part II concludes by briefly reviewing the district
court cases heard after Asadi.
I. United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—Asadi v. GE
Energy59
Asadi, the appellant, filed a lawsuit against GE Energy, the appellee,
claiming that GE Energy fired him after he made an internal complaint
about a possible securities violation.60 Asadi had accepted a position to
work as GE Energy’s Iraq Country Executive and moved to Jordan. While
there, Iraqi officials notified Asadi of their concerns that GE Energy had

56
57
58
59
60

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (a)(6) (2010).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(a) (2010).
Asadi v. GE Energy, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 621-22.

290

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 10:279

“hired a woman closely associated with a senior Iraqi official to curry favor
with that official in negotiating a lucrative joint venture agreement.”61
Asadi suspected that this behavior was a violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) and reported it to his supervisor and to the
ombudsperson for the region.62 Shortly thereafter, Asadi received a
negative performance evaluation and was pressured to step down to a
position with minimal responsibility.63 Asadi refused to be demoted and
was fired approximately one year after making the reports.64
In his complaint, Asadi claimed that GE Energy violated DoddFrank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions when it fired him
subsequent to his internal reports about possible FCPA violations.65 GE
Energy moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: (1) that DoddFrank’s whistleblower provisions do not apply extraterritorially; and (2)
that Asadi does not qualify as a whistleblower under the Act because he did
not report his claims to the SEC.66 The district court granted GE Energy’s
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim due to the fact that the
whistleblower provision does not apply to extraterritorial activity, but did
not decide whether Asadi qualified as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank.67
Asadi subsequently appealed.68 The only issue on appeal was the
interpretation of Dodd-Frank and was reviewed de novo.69
The Fifth Circuit framed the issue as “whether an individual who is not
a ‘whistleblower’ under the statutory definition . . . may, in some
circumstances, nevertheless seek relief under the whistleblower-protection
provision.”70 The Asadi court found that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
retaliation protection applies only to those who report to the SEC, and
because Asadi did not report to the SEC, he did not have a claim.71 The
Fifth Circuit recognized the prior case law at the district court level in favor
of Asadi’s position,72 but stated that those constructions relied on a

61

Id. at 621.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 622.
68
Id. at 621.
69
Id. at 622.
70
Id. at 623.
71
Id.
72
See Kramer v. Trans–Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 SRU, 2012 WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept.
25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v.
TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
62
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misreading of Dodd-Frank’s statutory provisions.73
Finding that there was no ambiguity in the statutory language, the
court looked only at the text of the statute.74 The Asadi court first looked at
Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower and found that the definition
alone “expressly and unambiguously requires that an individual provide
information to the SEC to qualify as a ‘whistleblower.’”75 The court then
compared the anti-retaliation provision.76 Asadi’s contention was that the
Third Section under the anti-retaliation provision conflicts with the
definition of whistleblower and does not require disclosure to the SEC.77
However, the Fifth Circuit declined to agree with Asadi’s analysis and
noted that the conflict only results if it were to read the three categories as
types of whistleblowers.78 Instead, the Asadi court interpreted the statute as
follows: under the plain language and structure, there is only one category
of whistleblower, which accords to the definition in the statute, and the
three categories represent the types of actions that, when taken by the
whistleblower, are protected.79 The Asadi court stated that the Third
Section, or type of action, is not superfluous because it “protects those
individuals who qualify as whistleblowers from retaliation on the basis of
other required or protected disclosures.”80
The Asadi court offered another reason as to why it believed that
Asadi’s construction of Dodd-Frank was problematic.81 The Asadi court
stated that extending protection beyond the statutory definition would
effectively render SOX moot because an individual who makes a claim
under SOX could also make a claim under Dodd-Frank on the basis that
SOX protected the disclosure. However, it is unlikely that any plaintiff
would choose to bring a claim under SOX as opposed to Dodd-Frank
because Dodd-Frank offers much more plaintiff friendly provisions.82

73

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624-30.
Id. A precursor to using statutory interpretation is to determine whether the plain language of
the statute is ambiguous. If it is not, then only the text of the statute will be analyzed. See infra Part III.
75 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as “any individual who provides,
or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6 (a)(6) (2010).
76
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
77
Id. at 624.
78
Id. at 626.
79
Id. at 625.
80
Id. at 628.
81
Id.
82
Id.
74
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II. United States District Court Cases
The following sub-sections first describe in detail the three district
court cases decided before Asadi that found for a broad interpretation of the
relevant statutory provisions. Second, these sub-sections give a brief
overview of the district court cases that were heard post-Asadi.
A. Pre-Asadi Cases
i. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.83
Egan, the plaintiff, was an employee of the defendant company,
TradingScreen. Egan learned that the CEO of TradingScreen was diverting
TradingScreen’s assets to another company, which the CEO owned solely.84
Egan also claimed that the CEO was using TradingScreen’s employees to
do unpaid work for the solely owned company, was cannibalizing
TradingScreen’s customer lists, and was invoicing at below-market rates.85
Egan claimed that this was costing TradingScreen hundreds of thousands of
dollars and was a threat to the business.86 Egan reported this information to
the president, who reported it to the board of directors.87 The board hired a
law firm to do an internal investigation, which corroborated Egan’s
claims.88 The board attempted to get the CEO to resign, but the CEO
gained control of the board and in turn did not resign.89 The CEO then fired
Egan.90 Egan claimed that the CEO violated the anti-retaliation provision
of Dodd-Frank when he fired him.91 TradingScreen claimed that Egan was
not eligible to bring a retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank because he did
not report his complaint directly to the SEC.92
The Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff could not
bring a claim because the company was privately held, where a public
company is required to bring a claim under Dodd-Frank.93 But, the Egan
court nevertheless analyzed whether, in regard to a public company, a claim
could be brought under Dodd-Frank’s retaliation provision if the plaintiff
reported internally as opposed to the SEC. The court stated in dicta that a

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 10 CIV. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *6 (Egan’s disclosures were not covered by SOX).
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plaintiff can bring a Dodd-Frank retaliation claim even if he or she did not
report to the SEC.94
Only the Third Section of the anti-retaliation provision was at issue.95
The Egan court engaged in statutory construction and first found that the
provision at issue was ambiguous because “a literal reading of the definition
of the term ‘whistleblower’ . . . , requiring reporting to the SEC, would
effectively invalidate [the Third Sections]’s protection of whistleblower
disclosures that do not require reporting to the SEC.”96 The court first
looked at legislative history of the act, but found that very little exists. The
court stated that the principles of statutory construction dictate that no
phrase or word shall be left superfluous when rendering a meaning for a
statute.97 To reconcile this canon of statutory construction, the court found
that the Third Section is a narrow exception to Dodd-Frank’s general
definition of a whistleblower.98 Therefore, to avail oneself of Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provisions, the court found that one must either report to the
SEC or claim that his or her disclosures fell under the Third Section, which
does not require reporting to the SEC.99
ii. Nollner v. South Baptist Convention, Inc.100
Nollner, the plaintiff, took a job offer to move to New Delhi for a term
of twenty-four to thirty-six months to perform missionary work and manage
the construction of a new office building, where his wife would also be
employed.101 Both husband and wife quit their jobs to take the new
positions.102 When plaintiff and his wife arrived in New Delhi, the situation
was not as they expected and they noticed some troubling issues at the site,
including: an absence of a bidding process for companies (the firms chosen
were owned by one individual); the corporation was operating through
dummy companies to conceal the nature of its operations; there were
incomplete records for invoices and payment; the contractor and the

94
Id. at *7 (“In sum, the anti-retaliation whistleblower protection provisions of the Dodd–Frank
Act require Plaintiff to show that he either provided information to the SEC, or that his disclosures fell
under the four categories listed in 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Since Plaintiff fails to allege the
latter, he must establish the former.”).
95
Id. at *8. The specific provision at issue was §76u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
96
Id. at *4.
97
Id. at *5.
98
Id.
99
Id. at *5 (which includes disclosures required or protected under SOX, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 1513(e) of title 18 of the United States Code, or any other regulation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission).
100
Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
101
Id. at 989.
102
Id.
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architect tried to bribe the plaintiff after he complained about their
performances; the contractor and the architect were paying bribes to local
officials; and they had obtained an improper or illegal permit.103 Nollner
reported his concerns to his supervisors and fellow employees multiple
times, and each time was ignored.104 Subsequently, Nollner was asked to
resign, but refused and was eventually fired.105 Nollner filed a complaint
under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions claiming that he was eligible
as a whistleblower for reporting concerns about the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”).106
The Nollner court held that Nollner could not bring a claim under
Dodd-Frank because the FCPA is not under the jurisdiction of the SEC, but
is instead under the Department of Justice.107 But, the court analyzed
whether the Third Section of the anti-retaliation provision requires a report
to be made directly to the SEC.108 The Nollner court found that the Third
Section does not require a whistleblower to report to the SEC directly, but
only that the disclosure was required by certain laws within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.109 The court stated, “[w]ith respect to the scope of [the Third
Section], the ‘catch-all’ anti-retaliation protections extend only to any ‘law,
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.’”110 The
court also applied statutory construction, stating that it “must, if possible,
give reasonable meaning to the Act’s terms without rendering any of the
language superfluous.”111 Accordingly, the court found as follows:
[The Third Section] of the anti-retaliation provisions [must be read] in
conjunction with the definition of whistleblower, which protects an
individual from retaliation for reporting “information relating to a
violation of the securities laws.” Thus, harmonizing these provisions, a
plaintiff seeking relief under anti-retaliation provision part (iii) must
demonstrate that the disclosure at issue relates to a violation of federal
securities laws. Furthermore, anti-retaliation provision part (iii) only
protects disclosures that are “required or protected” by laws, rules, or
regulations within the SEC’s jurisdiction. Thus, an employee is not
protected from retaliation if the disclosure at issue—even if relates to
an actual legal violation by the employer—concerns a disclosure that
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104
105
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107
108
109
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111

Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id.
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is not “required” or otherwise “protected” by a law, rule, regulation
within the SEC’s jurisdiction.112
Thus, the Nollner court, following the Egan court, also found that
when reporting violations under the Third Section, a plaintiff is not required
to report that information directly to the SEC.
iii. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corporation113
Kramer, the plaintiff, worked for the defendant, Trans-Lux, for
eighteen years as Vice President of human resources and administration.114
Kramer advised the CFO that the company required three people on the
pension plan committee, of which it had only two people at the time.115 The
CFO was one of the people on this committee and was also the sole trustee
for the pension plan.116 Kramer believed this created a conflict of interest
and reported his concerns internally.117 Changes were made to the pension
plans under the two-person committee, which required three people for a
decision to be made.118 The CFO was also required to bring some
amendments to the board of directors in addition to reporting them to the
SEC, but failed to do either.119 The CFO also ordered Kramer not to file a
form to the SEC, which would have disclosed the failure and would have
subjected the company to a fine.120 After reporting his concerns to the
board of directors, Kramer was stripped of many of his duties and
eventually fired.121
The court found that Kramer had alleged sufficient facts to support a
claim under Dodd-Frank even though he did not report to the SEC.122 The
court first found that the statute was ambiguous and noted, in regard to
reading the statute narrowly: “[s]uch a reading seems inconsistent with the
goal of the Dodd–Frank Act, which was to ‘improve the accountability and
transparency of the financial system,’ and create ‘new incentives and

112
Id.; Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 10 CIV. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066, *6 (S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2011) (“[M]erely alleging the violation of a law or rule under the SEC’s purview is not enough; a
plaintiff must allege that a law or rule in the SEC’s jurisdiction explicitly requires or protects disclosure
of that violation.”).
113
Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 3:11CV1424 SRU, 2012 WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25,
2012).
114
Id. at *2.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at *2-3.
118
Id. at *2.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at *3.
122
Id. at *7.
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protections for whistleblowers.’”123 The court next looked to the SEC’s
rule and determined that it was a permissible construction of Dodd-Frank.124
The Court referenced Egan and Nollner in stating that both have held that
the Third Section calls for a broad construction of the term whistleblower,
and found in accordance with those prior decisions.125
B. Post-Asadi Cases in Disagreement with Asadi
Since Asadi was decided in 2013, at least eight district court cases
have disagreed with the holding in Asadi. Overall, these cases find that the
statutory provisions at issue are ambiguous.126 The cases apply various
canons of statutory interpretation to arrive at a broad interpretation, finding
that a whistleblower reporting disclosures required by SOX does not need
to report to the SEC to avail him or herself of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
provisions. These courts have found that little legislative history exists on
this issue, but they all agree that Congress’s intent was unlikely to exclude a
whistleblower from protection under Dodd-Frank for reporting SOX
violations internally and not directly to the SEC.127 One court looked at the
definition of a whistleblower itself and found that if applying a definition to
a statutory provision would defeat the provision’s purpose, the court would
not mechanically apply that definition.128 Finally, the majority of these
cases tend to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation under the
Chevron analysis—relying on the SEC’s statement that a whistleblower
under the Third Section need not report directly to the SEC. 129 One court
even goes so far as to state that a narrow construction of Dodd-Frank would
render the Third Section moot.130 This is the majority view on the issue as
those courts which find for a broad interpretation heavily outweigh those
123

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5; see infra Part III.
125
Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4-5.
126
See Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. CIV.A. 13-4149 SDW, 2014 WL 940703, at *6
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F.
Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 566 F. App’x 719 (10th
Cir. 2014); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 CIV. 5914 JMF, 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May
21, 2013).
127
Bussing v. COR Clearing, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 730 (D. Neb. 2014); Connolly, 2014 WL
5473144, at *6.
128
Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
129
See Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Rosenblum, 984 F.
Supp. 2d at 146-47; Connolly, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6; Khazin, 2014 WL 940703, at *6; Murray, 2013
WL 2190084, at *4; Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., No. 13-CV-2073 NSR, 2014 WL 1870802
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014). For a better analysis of the Chevron rule as applied to this issue and for the
text of the SEC’s rule on this issue, see infra Part III.
130
Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
124
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that find for a narrow interpretation.
C. Post-Asadi Cases in Agreement with Asadi
Those post-Asadi cases that agree with Asadi’s holding all find that
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision is not ambiguous.131 These courts
find that only a whistleblower who reports directly to the SEC is protected
under all three prongs of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.132 One
court goes so far as to acknowledge the fact that numerous courts are in
disagreement about how to interpret the statute, but stated that just because
numerous courts disagree does not automatically render the statute
ambiguous.133 Because these courts find that the statute is unambiguous,
they look only at the plain language of the statute.134 In applying the plain
language of the statute, all of these courts find that there is no separate
definition of a whistleblower135 under the Third Section and that Congress
intended for a Dodd-Frank whistleblower to report directly to the SEC.136
Some of the courts analyze canons of statutory construction to claim
support for not applying a broad definition of the term whistleblower. They
find that by allowing a whistleblower who has not reported to the SEC to
bring a claim under the anti-retaliation provisions titled “Protection of
Whistleblower” would violate that section’s heading, which indicates it is
only for whistleblowers.137 Allowing a broad definition would also ignore
the plain language of the statute and would not give effect to every word
because it would render the words “to the commission” superfluous.138
Some of the courts also briefly address the SEC’s interpretation on the
issue, stating that it should not even be considered given that the statute is
not ambiguous on its face,139 and noting that even if they were to apply the
SEC’s interpretation, it would render the entire definitional section of the
Act superfluous.140
131 Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-CV-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *7 (M.D.
Fla. 2014); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Verfuerth v.
Orion Energy Systems, Inc., No. 14-C-352, 2014 WL 5782514, at *3 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
132
Verfuerth, 2014 WL 5782514, at *3.
133
Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *8.
134
Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-CV-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *5 (D. Colo.
2013).
135
Id.
136
Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *7.
137
Id. at *8.
138
Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756-57 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
139
Id. at 757.
140 Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-C-352, 2014 WL 5782514, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
2014); see generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249. For an analysis of the SEC’s rule on the issue see infra Part
III.
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Many of the courts also subscribe to and cite Asadi’s mootness
argument—stating that if the definition of whistleblower were interpreted
broadly, SOX would be rendered moot because no person would sue under
SOX given the more favorable provisions of Dodd-Frank.141 Finally, these
courts note that they have no issue prohibiting a whistleblower, who
reported internally only, from receiving retaliation protection under DoddFrank because that whistleblower has an outlet under SOX and should use it
if needed.142 This holding is the minority view.143
PART III
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions should be interpreted by
courts to find that whistleblowers who make disclosures required by SOX,
do not have to first report to the SEC to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provisions. There are two primary reasons why courts
should find for a broad definition of whistleblowers: (1) the traditional
canons of statutory interpretation lead to this result; and (2) public policy
weighs in favor of finding this result.
I. Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation, also referred to as statutory construction, is the
process that courts use to interpret and apply a statute. The first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the statute has plain meaning
or whether it is clear and unambiguous.144 If the text of the statute has plain
meaning or is unambiguous, then the “inquiry begins and ends with the
text.”145 No further analysis is required and that statute is applied as it is
written—the court should not consider even legislative history or purpose

141
Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-CV-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6 (D. Colo.
2013); Verfuerth, No. 14-C-352, 2014 WL 5782514, at *4.
142
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
143
Wagner, No. 12-CV-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6.
144
See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted) (“In any
event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all
others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this
first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”).
145
Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing BedRoc Ltd. v.
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002)
(“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”) (citing Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54)
(internal quotations omitted).
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of the statute.146 If the text of the statute is ambiguous, courts may use
statutory interpretation, which includes canons such as legislative history
and administrative regulations, to interpret the meaning of the statute.147
A. Step One: Does the Statute have Plain Meaning and Is It Clear and
Unambiguous?
To determine whether a statute has plain meaning and is clear and
unambiguous, one must look at “the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”148 Ambiguity can be found in a number of ways149—such as when
the text is difficult to understand or lacks clarity150 or when it is susceptible
to more than one reasonable meaning.151 Ambiguity can also exist when
reasonably well informed persons can interpret the statute to have two
different meanings.152
Whether the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision is ambiguous is the
main contention between the courts.
Those that favor a narrow
interpretation of the term “whistleblower” find that the statute is
unambiguous which automatically precludes any consideration of canons of
statutory interpretation. Those courts that find for a broad definition of the
term whistleblower find that the statutory provisions are ambiguous and are
able to find support for such a broad definition through use of canons of
statutory interpretation. Asadi and those courts that follow Asadi’s holding
are incorrect in finding that no ambiguity exists in the statute. There is
ambiguity between the definition of a whistleblower and the Third

146
147

In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010).
Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d

at 755.
148
Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997));
Healthkeepers, Inc. v. Richmond Ambulance Auth., 642 F.3d 466, 471 (4th Cir. 2011); Geo-Energy
Partners-1983 Ltd. v. Salazar, 613 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2010).
149
For a discussion on ambiguity in statutory interpretation see Brian G. Slocum, The
Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity
Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791 (2010).
150
Maldonado v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. Va. 1991).
151
In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298,
304 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010) (“A provision is ambiguous only where the disputed
language is ‘reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.’”).
152
See Slocum, supra note 149, at 800 (“Other definitions focus on the interpreter rather than
the text. One common definition, for example, posits that ambiguity ‘exists when a statute is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses’. . . .); see also In
re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Rather, a provision is ambiguous when, despite a studied
examination of the statutory context, the natural reading of a provision remains elusive. In such
situations of unclarity, ‘[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every
thing from which aid can be derived . . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)).
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Section.153 This ambiguity is most prominently highlighted by the fact that
it is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning and that reasonably
well-informed persons can interpret the statute in two different ways.
Nothing lends more support to this fact than the stark divide between courts
in interpreting the statute. Some courts interpret the provisions broadly,
while others interpret the provisions narrowly – a complete juxtaposition,
which is exemplary of ambiguity.154 Finally, a finding of ambiguity is also
supported by the text itself given the interplay between the definition of a
whistleblower and the subsequent provision prohibiting retaliation,
specifically the Third Section. There is a lack of clarity when reading these
two provisions together which raises questions as to how the two are
compatible and how they should be construed.
With such a finding of ambiguity in Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
provision, the courts should, and must, analyze canons of statutory
interpretation as a second step in the analysis.
B. Step Two: Using Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Subsequent to a finding of ambiguity in a statute, courts will look to
canons of statutory interpretation to decide how best to decipher the
meaning of the statute.
There are many canons of statutory
interpretation.155 The canons are not mandatory rules, but rather are a way
to help judges “determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular
statutory language.”156 The most popular canon, and that which is typically
used as a starting point, attempts to view the statute from the legislature’s
perspective,157 and includes looking to the legislature’s objectives, the
circumstances surrounding the law’s adoption, the history of the statute, and
153
But see Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-C-352, 2014 WL 5782514, at *4 (E.D.
Wis. 2014) (“[T]he belief that there is some kind of conflict in the statute is based on a flawed
understanding of the concept of statutory ambiguity. No term or phrase in the statute is actually
ambiguous. Instead, courts perceiving ambiguity appear flummoxed by the simple fact that the
protections in the statute extend to activity beyond the activity that qualifies an employee for protection.
But, as discussed above, there is nothing ‘ambiguous’ or conflicting about such a framework at all.
Accordingly, the plain language Congress employed should be given full effect.”).
154
See id.; Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 CIV. 5914 JMF, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (“The existence of these ‘competing, plausible interpretations’ of the statutory
provisions compels the conclusion that ‘the statutory text is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s
intent.’”).
155
See Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, CRS Report
for Congress, Congressional Research Service (August 31, 2008), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97589.pdf.
156
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94, 122 S. Ct. 528, 535, 151 L. Ed. 2d 474
(2001).
157
United States v. Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932) (“In aid of the process of
construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative history of
the measure and the statements by those in charge of it during its consideration by the Congress.”).
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the legislature’s declaration or purpose for the statute.158 However, the
legislature’s intent in creating a statute is not always clear or readily
available, and for this reason there are many other canons of statutory
interpretation that can be used.159
The courts which find for a broad definition of the term whistleblower
already provide a sufficient framework for applying canons in reaching
their holdings. The following analysis builds on that approach, discussing:
(1) legislative history as a canon because it is often the starting point; (2)
deference to an administrative agency as a canon under the Chevron
doctrine because, while it is thoroughly discussed by the courts, it lends the
most support for finding a broad definition; and (3) analyzing definitions as
a canon that lends much support but is not focused on by the courts in their
analyses.
i. Legislative History
In the case of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions,
there is little legislative history to guide statutory interpretation.160 It makes
sense that little legislative history exists in regard to the specific antiretaliation whistleblower provisions, because those provisions are only a
small part of a very large piece of legislation which addresses many
different subjects.161 However, legislative history does exist in regard to
Dodd-Frank as a whole, and that history states that Dodd-Frank was
enacted as being “a direct and comprehensive response to the financial
crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. economy beginning in 2008.”162 The
overall goal of the legislation is stated as being “to promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency

158
See generally Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (2003).
159
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
940 (2013) (“There are more than 100 substantive canons, and they run the range from transsubstantive
policy presumptions (e.g., ambiguous federal statutes will not be construed to intrude on traditional state
functions); to subject-specific rules (e.g., ambiguous bankruptcy statutes shall be construed in favor of
the debtor); to the dozen or so presumptions that concern delegation of interpretive authority to
administrative agencies. These canons are infamously conflicting, overlapping, and manipulable, and
have been described as everything from ‘judicial lawmaking’ to ‘democracy protective’ to
‘constitutional law.’”).
160
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011) (“The legislative history of the Act provides little evidence of Congress’s purpose. The
various committee reports and debates in Congress focus on the bounty provisions of the Act and
contain very few substantive discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.”).
161
See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207 (D. Neb. May 21,
2014) motion to certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
162
S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 2 (2010).
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in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.”163
While this excerpt is helpful in ascertaining the goal of the legislation
as a whole, there is little to no legislative history that addresses the exact
whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions at issue. 164 Therefore, legislative
history offers little guidance in resolving the issue, creating the need to turn
to alternative canons of statutory interpretation. However, the legislative
history will offer guidance in a later Section of this Comment when it is
discussed relative to public policy.165
In the absence of explicit Congressional intent, tracking the language
of the bill itself sheds some light on what may have been the intent of
Congress. When the bill was introduced, it contained both a bounty
program and an anti-retaliation provision.166 The bill defined the term
whistleblower to be an individual that reports information directly to the
SEC.167 However, the anti-retaliation provision in the bill did not reference
the term whistleblower, instead it referred to “employee, contractor, or
agent” as being the individuals who were protected from retaliation.168 The
original anti-retaliation provisions in the bill only included sections one and
two (providing tips to the SEC or assisting in an investigation or
proceeding).169 Only when the bill passed the Senate was the term
“whistleblower” incorporated into the anti-retaliation provision by replacing
the words “employee, contractor, or agent.”170 At the Senate level, the bill
163

S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 1 (2010).
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011) (“The legislative history of the Act provides little evidence of Congress’s purpose. The
various committee reports and debates in Congress focus on the bounty provisions of the Act and
contain very few substantive discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions. Of those few, none touch upon
the issue of whether reporting to the SEC is required for whistleblowers to avail themselves of the Act’s
anti-retaliation provisions.”).
165
See supra Part II.
166
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203
(as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009) and (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009); see Bussing v. COR
Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014) motion to certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238,
2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
167
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203
(as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009) and (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009); see Bussing, No. 8:12CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278.
168
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203
(as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009) and (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009). See Bussing, No. 8:12CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278.
169
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203
(as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009) and (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009). See Bussing, No. 8:12CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278.
170
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(h)(1)(A)
(May 20, 2010); see also Bussing, 2014 WL 3548278.
164
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still only contained the first two provisions of the anti-retaliation
protections—there was no Third Section as is seen in the current statute.
Therefore, “there was no reason to anticipate that any conflict would arise
from the replacement of the phrase ‘employee, contractor, or agent’ with
the term ‘whistleblower.’”171 The Third Section was added later in the
process in a draft of the conference committee base text which was used to
finalize the act—although no indication was given as to why, other than
perhaps as a catch-all provision.172 Congress was likely not aware of any
inconsistency between the adding of the Third Section and the definition of
whistleblower.173
By tracking the language of the bill from its inception to the final
version, there is clear support for the fact that Congress likely did not intend
for the Third Section to be susceptible to the definition of whistleblower.
What is more likely is that Congress intended the addition of the Third
Section as a catch all provision near the end of finalizing the bill without
realizing the incongruity present in this section relevant to the definitional
section.
ii. Analyzing Definitions
Another canon of statutory interpretation is to analyze the definition of
the word at issue. One version of this canon is that “[i]f the word or phrase
is defined in the statute . . . in a ‘definitions’ section . . . or elsewhere in the
United States Code, then that definition governs if applicable in the context
used.”174 However, in contrast, case law gives further guidance in that “[i]f
the context indicates otherwise, i.e., if a mechanical application of a
statutory definition throughout a statute would create an ‘obvious
incongruity’ or frustrate an evident statutory purpose for a particular
provision, then it is permissible to depart from the definition.”175
Although Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as one who reports
directly to the SEC, there is an incongruity when this definition is applied to
the Third Section of the anti-retaliation provision.176 A mechanical
application of the term whistleblower to the Third Section applies a
restrictive definition to a term that as written, was meant to be broad. As
written, the Third Section extends protection to those who have made
disclosures required or protected by laws within the SEC’s jurisdiction—a
171

Bussing, 2014 WL 3548278.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Kim, supra note 155; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
175
Id.; see also Lawson v. Suwannee S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).
176
See generally Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. 2014).
motion to certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
172
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broad range of disclosures, which can be considered a catch-all provision.
To apply the definition of a whistleblower to the Third Section
mechanically and to require these disclosures be made to the SEC,
unnecessarily restricts this provision, and it no longer becomes such a
catch-all to extend protection to those not falling in any other category. The
plaintiff in one district court case stated this conundrum as follows: “the
definition of the term ‘whistleblower’ must be too narrow: after all, how
could the definition of a whistleblower be limited to people who report to
the Commission, when the statute protects against retaliation for disclosures
to the whistleblower’s employer?”177 Because of this obvious incongruity,
it is “permissible to depart from the definition.”178 Therefore, the
mechanical definition of a whistleblower should be departed from in the
Third Section.
iii. Deference to an Administrative Agency (Chevron Analysis)
Deference to an administrative agency’s rulemaking authority in
interpreting a statute is a canon of statutory interpretation that is appropriate
in certain situations. The Chevron rule guides the analysis, and allows for
deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute if certain
requisites are met. The Chevron rule, established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,179 is as follows: “When a court
reviews an agency’s formal interpretation of a statute that the agency
administers, and when the statute has not removed agency discretion by
compelling a particular disposition of the matter at issue, courts defer to any
reasonable agency interpretation.”180 Two other cases in 2000 and 2001
narrowed the Chevron rule to create the following two-step application.181
Step one is to inquire “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”182 If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
177
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014).
178
Lawson, 336 U.S. at 201 (“Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of
course, in the usual case. But this is an unusual case. If we read the definition . . . in a mechanical
fashion, we create obvious incongruities in the language, and we destroy one of the major purposes of
the . . . provision. . . . We have concluded that Congress would not have intended such a result.”).
179
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
180
Kim, supra note 155, at 23.
181
Id. (“In two decisions, one in 2000 and one in 2001 the Court clarified and narrowed
Chevron’s application, ruling that Chevron deference applies only if an agency’s interpretation is the
product of a formal agency process, such as adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, through
which Congress has authorized the agency ‘to speak with the force of law.’ Other agency interpretations
that are made without the protections of a formal and public process are reviewed under pre-Chevron
principles set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.”).
182
Id.
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unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.183 However, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court applies step
two—”whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”184 Finally, “[i]f the agency interpretation is reasonable, then
[a court] must defer to it.”185 This is only the basic premise of the Chevron
rule, and while an analysis of statutory interpretation under the Chevron
rule is more complicated, it is outside the scope of this article.
The Chevron analysis should be applied to Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision because both steps are met. Step one of the analysis is
met because the intent of Congress is not clear in regard to the DoddFrank’s anti-retaliation provision; this was established above. Step two
requires an analysis of the SEC’s interpretation on the issue and whether it
is a permissible construction of the statute, which analysis follows below.
The SEC, which is the relevant administrative agency, adopted formal
rules in 2011 to address the definition of whistleblower and whistleblower
retaliation under Dodd-Frank. The SEC formal rules state:
(b) Prohibition against retaliation:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by
Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)),
you are a whistleblower if:
(i)   You possess a reasonable belief that the information
you are providing relates to a possible securities law
violation (or, where applicable, to a possible
violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C.
1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about
to occur, and;
(ii)   You provide that information in a manner described
in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)(A)).
(iii)  The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not
you satisfy the requirements, procedures and
conditions to qualify for an award.186
In its comments, the SEC further expanded on the rule, stating:
The second prong of the Rule 21F-2(b)(1) standard provides that, for
purposes of the anti-retaliation protections, an individual must provide
the information in a manner described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A). This

183
184
185
186

Id.
See id.
Id.
Whistle Blower Status and Retaliation Protection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2 (2011).
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change to the rule reflects the fact that the statutory anti-retaliation
protections apply to three different categories of whistleblowers, and
the third category includes individuals who report to persons or
governmental authorities other than the Commission. Specifically,
Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii)—which incorporate the anti-retaliation
protections specified in Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18
U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1)(C)—provides anti-retaliation protections for
employees of public companies, subsidiaries whose financial
information is included in the consolidated financial statements of
public companies, and nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations when these employees report to (i) A Federal regulatory
or law enforcement agency, (ii) any member of Congress or committee
of Congress, or (iii) a person with supervisory authority over the
employee or such other person working for the employer who has
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct. However,
the retaliation protections for internal reporting afforded by Section
21F(h)(1)(A) do not broadly apply to employees of entities other than
public companies.187
The SEC explicitly states that whistleblowers in the Third Category
can report to persons other than the SEC itself and still be afforded
protection under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. By way of the
SEC’s interpretation of the statute, whistleblowers making disclosures
under the Third Section do not have to report to the SEC in order to file a
claim for retaliation under Dodd-Frank. This Comment argues that
deference to the administrative agency is appropriate, given the ambiguity
present in the statutory text.188 Therefore, the Chevron rule in conjunction
with the SEC’s formal rules on this issue govern relatively clearly that there
is no requirement that a whistleblower report SOX violations to the SEC to
bring a retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank.
C. Non-Traditional Canon of Statutory Interpretation: Public Policy
While traditional cannons of statutory interpretation lend sufficient
support to a finding that whistleblowers do not need to report directly to the
SEC when making disclosures under the Third Section of Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provision, this Comment argues for use of a non-traditional
canon of statutory interpretation, one that lends stronger support to this
finding as being in accord with the legislative goals of the statute overall.
This Comment suggests that courts look to public policy in guiding its
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank. Although
187
188

17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249 (emphasis added).
An analysis of the applicability of the Chevron rule is outside the scope of this note.
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public policy is not a traditional or frequently used canon of statutory
interpretation, it is useful in resolving the present issue.
The following Section discusses two policy considerations in
interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions under Dodd-Frank. First, this
Section describes when it is appropriate to use public policy in statutory
interpretation. Second, this Section refutes the Asadi Court’s argument that
SOX would be rendered moot if whistleblowers were not required to report
to the SEC, and responds with a policy argument showing that the converse
also results in rendering SOX moot. Finally, this Section looks to the
overall goal of Dodd-Frank to guide the interpretation of the whistleblower
provisions to be in accordance with public policy.
i. When to Use Public Policy
When a court uses public values to guide statutory interpretation, it
should analyze the question before it and decide if a public value is at
issue.189 If a public value is implicated, the court should place less concern
on the actual text of the statute and will rather examine the policy
underlying the statute. In this case, the court should heavily rely on public
value in crafting an interpretation of that statute.190 The court may also rely
on public policy as a guide for statutory interpretation in the case that
conventional methods do not yield results.191
The issue of how to interpret Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions
lends itself to using public policy as a guide to statutory interpretation. A
public value is at issue in the case of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowers because
Dodd-Frank itself was created to address public concerns about the state of
the economy after the 2008 recession. The public value implicated is the
prevention of economic crises. This goal is clear because it is the
underlying impetus that drove both the creation of SOX and Dodd-Frank.192
With a clear public value identified, the courts should weigh public value
189

Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 645, 648

(1996).
190

Id. (“Public values statutory interpretation is a device used by the courts to correct what the
judiciary perceives to be an injustice. It is a mode of analysis used for reaching not only the morally
right result, but also the result that most furthers public policy.”); see also id. at n.18 (“Holy Trinity
Church is a historically important decision, standing for the proposition that a court should not blindly
adhere to the literal interpretation of a statute. The court should attempt to determine whether the policy
underlying the statute would be effectuated by its enforcement in that particular case. Additionally, the
court should examine the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a statute to truly determine its
legislative purpose.”).
191
H. Miles Foy, III, On Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 291,
299 (2010) (“In other words, if the conventional methods of statutory interpretation are indeterminate,
the judge may allow a personal sense of justice, equity, practicality, or sound public policy to determine
the outcome.”).
192
See supra Part I.
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considerations more heavily in crafting a statutory interpretation rather than
strictly analyzing the text of the statute itself.
One scholar offers a solution for effectively integrating traditional
statutory interpretation with public policy; the two-step process is as
follows. First, “the court uses traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
such as text, legislative history, and canons and presumptions of
construction, to determine the range of plausible meanings to ambiguous
statutory clauses.”193 In this first step, the court acts as an impartial
observer and is trying to gather a range of possible interpretations that may
have been intended by Congress.194 The second step consists of the court
engaging in a policy analysis for each of the possible interpretations
collected in step one.195 In this second step, “the court’s reasoning and
analysis centers upon which of the several plausible interpretations is the
most public-regarding.”196 According to this scholar, the first step is
statutory interpretation while the second step is regarded as statutory
construction, whereby the court is shaping statutory law.197
Applying this two-step approach to Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
provisions also leads to a conclusion that the provisions should be
interpreted broadly. Under step one, there are two possible interpretations
of the statute: (1) a narrow interpretation whereby whistleblowers making
disclosures required or protected by SOX must report to the SEC to avail
themselves of the anti-retaliation provision; and (2) a broad interpretation
whereby whistleblowers making disclosures required or protected by SOX
do not have to report to the SEC (an internal report is sufficient) to avail
themselves of the anti-retaliation provision. Step two requires a policy
analysis of the two possible interpretations. The remainder of this note
attempts to do just that—analyze the policy issues at stake between the two
possible interpretations of the statute, ultimately finding that policy weighs
heavily in favor of a broad reading of the statute.
ii. Public Policy at Issue in Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision
The Asadi Court made a clear policy argument in favor of a narrow
interpretation of the provision at issue; however in making this argument,
the Court failed to address the converse of its argument. The policy based
contention of the Asadi Court was that if, under Dodd-Frank,
whistleblowers reporting disclosures required by SOX are not required to

193
194
195
196
197

Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 720 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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report to the SEC, then SOX will effectively be rendered moot.198
According to the Asadi Court, SOX will be rendered moot because if
plaintiffs are not required to report to the SEC to avail themselves of DoddFrank’s anti-retaliation provisions, then any plaintiff with a retaliation claim
will immediately bypass the cause of action in SOX, and go straight to
alleging a complaint under Dodd-Frank. The reason for this is that DoddFrank offers much more plaintiff-friendly provisions than SOX does. In
making this policy argument, the Asadi Court stated:
[C]onstruing the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection provision to
extend beyond the statutory definition of “whistleblowers” renders the
SOX anti-retaliation provision, for practical purposes, moot. Such a
construction has this impact because an individual who makes a
disclosure that is protected by the SOX anti-retaliation provision could
also bring a Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection claim on the basis
that the disclosure was protected by SOX. It is unlikely, however, that
an individual would choose to raise a SOX anti-retaliation claim
instead of a Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection claim.199
In rebuttal to this argument, this Comment argues that there is another
mootness issue not recognized by the Asadi court. The Asadi court failed to
consider that SOX would also be rendered moot if whistleblowers are
required to report to the SEC in order to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provision. An employee’s decision to blow the whistle is
often guided by an incentive structure;200 therefore, the Asadi court is right
when it states that given the choice, a person would likely choose to bring
an anti-retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank rather than SOX. If the statute
is interpreted to require whistleblowers, reporting disclosures required by
SOX, to report to the SEC to gain advantages under Dodd-Frank, then
whistleblowers will do just that. Again, because people are to some extent
incentive driven, if people are required to report to the SEC in order to avail

198

Asadi v. GE Energy, 720 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 628-29.
200 See Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-house Attorney
Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3341, 3348 (2014) (stating in regard to whistleblowers “monetary rewards were shown to be
decisive. . . . offering a large monetary reward or imposing a legal duty to report and granting a large
monetary reward provided a very strong incentive for blowing the whistle.”); see also Justin Blount &
Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as we Know It, or an Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1052 (2012) (“The size of the bounty
is critical, as small monetary awards were not a strong incentive and actually decreased the rate of
reporting when there was no moral outrage at the conduct reported.”). While money is a contributing
factor in a whistleblower’s decision to report information, whistleblower incentive structures tend to be
much more complicated; see generally id. at 1050-51 (describing in depth different incentive factors).
199
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themselves of the more beneficial anti-retaliation provisions under DoddFrank, people will most certainly comply with the requirements of DoddFrank to ensure they will be protected in the case of retaliation.201 These
employees will bypass their companies’ internal compliance systems, and
report any concerns about securities violations directly to the SEC.202
When whistleblowers report directly to the SEC while bypassing internal
reporting, the internal compliance systems set up under SOX are destroyed.
Companies no longer have the opportunity to remedy violations.203 In this
instance, SOX is effectively rendered moot,204 given the fact that the
internal reporting channels painstakingly established by SOX are no longer
being utilized and are effectively destroyed.205 The policy and impetus
201
See generally Jenny Lee, Corporate Corruption and the New Gold Mine: How the DoddFrank Act Overincentivises Whistleblowing, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 303, 326-27 (“As a result, the DoddFrank Act’s unnecessary and excessive bounty program, coupled with its expansive antiretaliation
protection, overincentivizes whistleblowing and is likely to lead to the waste of administrative
resources.”).
202
See generally Thomas S. Markey, III., “Whistleblower” Redefined: Implications of the
Recent Interpretative Split on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Provision, 33 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 441, 449 (2014) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit’s interpretation may discourage employees
from reporting internally because employees could only gain anti-retaliation protection if they
subsequently report to the SEC.”); Shannon Kay Quigley, Whistleblower Tug-of-War: Corporate
Attempts to Secure Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided
by the Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2012) (stating that “employees will
‘flee’ to the federal government instead of reporting misconduct to the corporation”).
203
See generally Rich Steeves, Whistling Down the Wind: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblowing Program, INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/
2014/01/27/whistling-down-the-wind-the-pitfalls-and-possibili (“[C]ompanies would prefer to have no
problems that would warrant whistleblowing in the first place. But, if workers do have an inkling that
something untoward is happening, they have two primary options: reporting internally or externally.
Due to the considerable risk of prosecution, sanctions and damage to reputation associated with
whistleblowers who report to the SEC, businesses would certainly prefer if matters are handled in
house.”).
204
See generally Quigley, supra note 202 at 268-69 (“The Dodd-Frank Act adversely
encourages whistleblowers to report to the government, instead of the corporation, by increasing
monetary incentives and strengthening the protections provided to employees. This decreases the
effectiveness of compliance programs by reducing the number of employees willing to utilize internal
reporting mechanisms. . . . [M]any . . . companies, criticize the Dodd-Frank Act for damaging their
internal compliance programs. Prior to the enactment of the SEC’s rules under the Dodd-Frank Act,
SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes admitted that the proposed rules ‘might not do enough to preserve the
important role that corporate compliance programs serve. It would be unfortunate if, as a result of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower program, effective corporate compliance programs were thwarted.’”); id. at
271 (“As the employee weighs the benefits and disadvantages of reporting externally, an employer faced
with a potential violation may report to the government prematurely in an attempt to gain sentencing
benefits. If the corporation has not completed a thorough investigation, the employer is inviting the
government to examine the company even when a securities law violation did not occur.”).
205
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial but (Potentially) Precarious Position of the
Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 56, 73 (2013) (“[S]ome commentators
feared that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions would ‘undermine the effectiveness of . . . internal
compliance programs’ because Dodd-Frank created incentives in the form of a monetary reward
program (not at issue in Asadi) to report directly to the SEC.”); William McLucas, Laura Wertheimer &
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behind SOX is destroyed when the internal compliance systems it created
are destroyed.
It seems like either way, whether whistleblowers must or need not
report to the SEC to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank, SOX is left moot in
some way. So, the question that results is, which of the two evils should
courts choose? Which construction is in the best interest of public policy?
Is it more important to preserve the legacy of SOX through internal
compliance structures, effectively preserving the overall goal of both
statutes, which is to prevent financial crisis, and thus allow Dodd-Frank to
operate in conjunction with SOX? Or is it more important to essentially
bifurcate the two statutes, demanding that the two causes of action remain
wholly distinct, thereby forcing plaintiffs to comply with strict requirements
to avail themselves of either provision simply in order to preserve a cause
of action under SOX, by procedurally forcing plaintiffs to choose one
statute over the other?
This note argues in favor of the former contention—until Congress
amends the statute to give a more clear understanding of its true intentions,
courts should aim to preserve the overall policy goals of both Dodd-Frank
and SOX. This can be done by interpreting Dodd-Frank to allow for
whistleblowers who report internally to file a retaliation claim action under
Dodd-Frank. Thereby, courts can preserve the legacy of SOX by ensuring
that internal compliance systems remain intact while at the same time
promoting the policy goals of each statute by encouraging whistleblowers
to report securities fraud by providing them with the much more plaintiff
friendly provisions under Dodd-Frank. The following sections discuss why
it is in the best interest of public policy to interpret Dodd-Frank in a way
that also preserves the policy goals of SOX—both of which are to prevent
future economic crises in this country. This course of action accomplishes
this goal in two ways: first, it supports whistleblowers, who are vital
ingredients in exposing violations and fraud, and second, it preserves
internal compliance systems set up by SOX, essential to remedying
violations internally.
First, the support of whistleblowers is a public value at issue in this

Arian June, Don’t Tread on Whistleblowers: Mitigating and Managing Retaliation Risks, 46 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 77, at *10-11 (Jan. 13, 2014) (“Director McKessy recently noted the ‘irony’ that
‘many of the companies’ which had urged the SEC to impose mandatory internal reporting requirement
in its implanting rules before an individual could qualify for a SEC whistleblower bounty were not
arguing that individuals who reported internally would not be entitled to Dodd-Frank protection from
retaliation. He speculated that, ‘if word gets out that reporting internally means you will be unprotected,
that may drive people to report to [the SEC]’ and bypass internal reporting channels to ensure that they
are protected against retaliatory conduct.”); Markey, supra note 202, at 450 n.64 (“arguing that the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation will ‘frustrate’ the SEC’s ‘careful and laborious efforts’ to promote compliance
with securities laws without undermining companies’ internal reporting structures”).
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case—one which should be protected given the importance of
whistleblowers in exposing corporate violations. Whistleblowers can be an
important part of preventing securities fraud because, as corporate
employees, they are often the ones who bring forward claims of corporate
wrongdoing.206 Congress crafted the whistleblower regulations of SOX
with the importance of whistleblowers in fraud detection in mind.207 The
benefit of employees acting as whistleblowers is that employees often have
access to information that others lack.208 Employees have access to their
companies’ current information, and are therefore typically the first people
who realize that something is wrong.209 A study of the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners found that forty-six percent of all frauds were
uncovered by whistleblowers.210 Protecting whistleblowers does two
things: it encourages legal compliance, which benefits the public, and can
lighten the burden of government regulators on ensuring that companies are
in compliance.211 Protection of whistleblowers is within the policy goals of
both Dodd-Frank and SOX because at each statutes’ core is the desire to
prevent economic crises. A broad interpretation of the statutes does just
this: it affords whistleblowers greater options and does not procedurally
force them into complying with a reporting scheme or structure. Perhaps
whistleblowers are more comfortable coming forward with information
internally than to the SEC. It is possible that a mandate to report to the SEC
may discourage some whistleblowers, thereby creating a hindrance to the
overall goal of the statute.
Second, another public value at issue is the preservation of SOX’s
internal compliance systems which address potential securities violations
within a company.212 Potential violations of fraud are best dealt with
206
See Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really
Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of
Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the U.S. and China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 902 (2011).
207
See generally Jisoo Kim, Confessions of A Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the
Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 249-50 (2009)
(“Moreover, in a recent study measuring the effectiveness of various methods of detecting corporate
fraud, internal employees—in other words, whistleblowers—turned out to be the most effective
monitors in detecting fraud.”).
208
See id.
209 See Whistleblower Protection: Encouraging Reporting, OECD (July 2012), http://
www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50042935.pdf.
210 See Changing Corporate Culture, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. (last visited Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_advancedtags&view=tag&id=80 (“In the 2008
Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the ACFE examined 959 cases of fraud related
to American corporations.”).
211 See Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-house Attorney
Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering A Possible Federal Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3341, 3355 (2014).
212
See generally Alison B. Miller, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and
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internally as opposed to externally as it gives the company an opportunity
to fix what may be wrong.213 Affording companies the opportunity to
investigate claims of potential securities violations allows them to be
remedied before they are reported to the federal government.214 The
benefits of internal reporting by whistleblowers include the prompt
investigation of concerns, the opportunity to correct wrongful conduct, and
to allow for a correction of misunderstandings.215 Allowing a narrow
interpretation of the statutes effectively eliminates the internal compliance
systems, but a broad interpretation preserves such systems. Finding for the
broad interpretation is in the best policy interest.
CONCLUSION
The situation is ripe for a circuit split. If a circuit split does ensue in
the near future, and if this issue eventually reaches the level of the United
States Supreme Court, the Court should interpret the anti-retaliation
provisions under Dodd-Frank to find that a whistleblower need not report
directly to the SEC when making disclosures required by SOX in order to

the Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO. L.J. 1647, 1649-50 (2014) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) strengthened internal compliance requirements, establishing the corporate audit committee as a
gatekeeper responsible for policing accounting and financial reporting fraud. Under SOX, audit
committees must be authorized to receive complaints and retain outside, independent counsel in the
event an investigation is warranted. DOJ and SEC memoranda have also emphasized that a company’s
willingness to cooperate with regulators—such as by taking remedial actions or voluntarily disclosing
wrongdoing—is a crucial factor that influences agency enforcement decisions.”).
213 See Corporate Law - Securities Regulation - Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers
to Report Suspected Violations to the Sec. - Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, S 922, 124 Stat.
1376, 1841-49 (2010) (to Be Codified, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1834-35 (2011) (“‘[i]f . . . the primary
goal of whistleblowing is reduction of wrongdoing rather than prosecution of wrongdoers, and the speed
with which problems are addressed is significant, then internal whistleblowing should be preferred’ to
external whistleblowing. . . . Because a ‘culture of compliance and integrity’ is vital to the maintenance
of effective internal compliance programs, and the ‘sine qua non requirement for these programs to
work . . . is the expectation that employees will report misconduct internally,’ this incentive to report
externally could unravel the years of effort that have been put into maintaining healthy internal
compliance systems.”).
214
See Nicole H. Sprinzen, Asadi v. GE Energy (Usa) L.L.C.: A Case Study of the Limits of
Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections and the Impact on Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 151, 152 (2014) (“Companies want their employees to first report alleged legal violations
internally—not externally— so that they can investigate the allegation, decide whether there is a
violation, and determine whether they can defend against the allegation, identify any wrongdoers, and
remediate the situation.”); see also Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638-39
(2008) (“In many cases, the most effective method of correcting corporate misconduct is by reporting
violations internally to supervisors or senior managers who may be unaware of problems within the
company.”); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting
the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 300 (1991).
215
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, Sox and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760
(2007).
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later bring a retaliation claim. The Court should find that the Third Section,
under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, is an exception to the general
definition of a whistleblower.
Not only do the traditional canons of statutory interpretation, when
applied to the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank, lead to this
conclusion, but potentially more importantly, it is in the best interest of
public policy to interpret the statutes this way. After all, the overall goals
of SOX and Dodd-Frank is to prevent financial economic crises. This goal
is best served by maintaining internal compliance systems and providing
whistleblowers with adequate protection.
There may be concerns that allowing courts to engage in such a
flexible form of statutory construction will allow the courts to implement
their own policies, rather than those of Congress.216 However, of equal
concern is that engaging in a strictly textualist approach to statutory
interpretation will defeat the original Congressional intent and purpose
behind a particular statute.217 In reality, there is little concern over the court
shaping statutory law because it does not have the same incentive as
Congress for molding statutes to conform with “interest-group-serving
deals aimed at serving narrow constituencies carrying disproportionate
voices at the expense of broader public concerns.”218 Further, the judicial
process, unlike the legislative one, is based on reasoning and analysis
instead of politics and bargaining.219 Other benefits of allowing courts to
engage in such an analysis are that it “allows [for] the incorporation of
information the enacting Congress could not have accessed, such as how
the statute functions in practice, changes in the legal landscape, and changes
in underlying social values.”220 This theory can be in accord with the
separation of powers.221 Interpreting a statute to be in accord with public
216
Maura A. Flood, “Kennewick Man” or “Ancient One”? - A Matter of Interpretation, 63
MONT. L. REV. 39, 64 (2002).
217
Id.
218 Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 720 (1996).
219 Id. at 722 (“Under the two-step interpretive process, political bargaining determines the
parameters of statutory policy, and in cases of ambiguity the reasoned analysis of the judicial process
works along public-regarding lines.”).
220
Id.
221
Id. at 722-23 (“Apart from and much more important than these prudential concerns, the twostep approach to statutory interpretation, unlike statutory interpretation theories rooted in the honest
agent conception, is fully compatible with the popular sovereignty and separation of powers theory of
the federal Constitution. By affording courts an institutional role in shaping statutory law along publicregarding lines, the federal courts are transformed from agents of Congress into agents of the people.
Yet the first step of the interpretive process, which constrains the range of the judicial policy discretion
in the second step, insures that the institutional role of Congress is not emasculated or rendered
superfluous. The two-step process, in short, affords both the first and third branches separate but
overlapping roles in the making of statutory law. When authoring a statute Congress checks the courts
by setting the parameters of judicial discretion; the courts check Congress by shaping ambiguous
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policy is typically not the role of the court. However, as discussed above,
public values and public policy can guide statutory interpretation to a
certain extent. If Congress finds that the court interprets the statute in an
inappropriate way or in a way that is divergent from its original intentions,
Congress can certainly amend the statute to reflect its true goals. However,
equally as likely is the fact that Congress may not amend the statute,
thereby agreeing with the court’s interpretation as being in the best interest
of public policy.
In future cases, this Comment suggests that courts use a broad
interpretation of the Third Section, or 15 U.S.C. § 76u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii),
finding it to be an exception to the general rule that whistleblowers must
report to the SEC in order to bring a retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank.
This construction will allow whistleblowers who report claims covered by
SOX, and who suffer retaliation because of it, to file claims for retaliation
under Dodd-Frank without having to first report those claims directly to the
SEC. Whistleblowers who find it best to report concerns internally, and
who later suffer retaliation based on their internal reports, will still be
afforded retaliation protection under Dodd-Frank.
By allowing whistleblowers who report internally to bring retaliation
claims under Dodd-Frank, the courts will allow SOX and Dodd-Frank to
work in conjunction with one another to better serve the public policy goals
of both, which is to prevent future economic crises.
As noted,
whistleblowers can be an important part of early detection of securities
fraud, and by interpreting Dodd-Frank in the way suggested, the internal
compliance systems of SOX are preserved, which allows companies the
chance to remedy violations internally before they become a larger
problem.

statutory law within those parameters. Finally, Congress may again check the courts by revising or
clarifying statutes. Each branch plays a distinctly different institutional role but also operates as a peer
or coequal player in the statutory law-creating game. The two-step approach to statutory interpretation
represents a moderate option between the honest agent conception at one extreme and the radical
revisionary approach at the other. While the honest agent conception renders the federal courts
subordinate agents of Congress, and the radical revisionary interpretive approach renders the acts of
Congress impotent, the two-step approach to statutory interpretation allows both Congress and the
federal courts to act as agents of the people, with neither subordinate to the other.”).

